Dilemma of international cooperation on climate change

Dilemma of international cooperation on climate change

 

Introduction (Approximately 2~3 page)

Overview of climate change (http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/climatechange/)

Need for international cooperation (see “7 International Cooperation – 1 A Game Theoretic Perspective”)

  • Global public good
  • No international agency can establish and enforce a binding policy
  • International agreement(s) needed for large‐scale internationally coordinated emission reductions

Dilemma or difficulties of international cooperation (see “7 International Cooperation – 1 A Game Theoretic Perspective”)

  • Non‐excludability gives agents incentive to free‐ride
  • When countries differ in their costs and/or benefits, it becomes harder to establish a coalition
  • Etc

Research question

  • Why Strong binding agreement or international organization is required to enhance international cooperation based on game theory

 

Background (Approximately 2~3 page)

Theoretical foundations

  • game theory

Literature review

  • 4 ~ 5 related literatures (a summary of extant arguments in the literature, and limitations or lacunae in the literature)

 

Theoretical answer (Approximately 4~5 page)

Research design

  • Game theory (see “7 International Cooperation – 1 A Game Theoretic Perspective”)

Solutions

  • include penalties for defection

‐> Can change payoff matrix to make {Abate,Abate} Nash equilibrium

  • The treaty must be enforced by the parties themselves (Punishment system…)
  • etc

 

conclusion (1 page)

 

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